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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RICHARD ARLAN BERGESEN,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 48533-2020
Ada County Case No.
CR01-18-50441

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Bergesen failed to show that the district court erred when, on intermediate appeal, the
court affirmed Bergesen’s sentence of 365 days in jail with 185 days suspended following his
conviction for violating a protection order?
ARGUMENT
Bergesen Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Affirming Bergesen’s Sentence
On Intermediate Appeal
A.

Introduction
Out of fear for her safety, Bergesen’s ex-girlfriend, Ms. Montgomery, secured a protection

order preventing him from having any contact with her either directly or through any third-party.
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(Tr., p. 151, L. 24 – p. 156, L. 8; p. 277, L. 24 – p. 279, L. 14 (Ms. Montgomery recounting events
leading to protection order); Conf. Exs., pp. 2-5 (protection order). 1) She then received a text
message from Bergesen’s friend, Mr. Severa, stating that Bergesen asked him to “see if [she] would
call” Bergesen because Bergesen “has some things of [hers] he would like to give back,” and
providing Bergesen’s phone number. (Tr., p. 156, L. 9 – p. 158, L. 20; Conf. Exs., p. 1 (text
exchange).) In a recorded call with a police officer, Bergesen acknowledged that he asked Mr.
Severa to contact Ms. Montgomery, purportedly to return her Bible that was in his possession.2
(State’s Ex. 3. 3)
The state charged Bergesen with one count of violation of the protection order. (R., pp.
49-50.) At trial, the state introduced the protection order, the text exchange, and the recorded call.
(Tr., p. 154, L. 1 – p. 155, L. 3; p. 161, L. 4 – p. 162, L. 6; p. 192, L. 5 – p. 194, L. 6.) In addition,
an officer testified that he spoke with Mr. Severa and he confirmed that Bergesen asked him to
contact Ms. Montgomery. (Tr., p. 214, L. 5 – p. 215, L. 20.) Bergesen, a disbarred attorney,
represented himself. (Tr., p. 3, L. 6 – p. 5, L. 11.) He called his friend Mr. Severa, who testified
that Bergesen never asked him to contact Ms. Montgomery, that he did it on his own initiative,
and that he never told the officer otherwise. (Tr., p. 206, L. 13 – p. 209, L. 21; p. 212, L. 3 – p.
213, L. 6.) The jury returned a guilty verdict. (Tr., p. 272, L. 9 – p. 273, L. 9; R., p. 52.) The
magistrate court issued a new protection order, placed Bergesen on two years of probation, waived
fines and court costs, and imposed a sentence of 365 days in jail with 185 days suspended. (Tr.,
p. 301, L. 16 – p. 303, L. 7; R., pp. 58 – 62.)
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Citation to “Tr.” are to the transcripts in the file titled “Appeal Exhibits 02-18-2021 ...” and
citations to “Conf. Exs.” are to the document titled “Appeal Confidential Exhibits 02-18-2021 ....”
2
Ms. Montgomery later testified that she did not leave any Bible of hers in Bergesen’s possession.
(Tr., p. 158, L. 21 – p. 160, L. 5.)
3
State’s Exhibit 3 is in the record in an mp4 file titled “AXON_Body_2_Video_2018 . . . .”
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Bergesen filed a timely notice of appeal to the district court. (R., pp. 65 – 67.) He argued,
in relevant part, that the magistrate court imposed an excessive sentence. (R., pp. 212-14. 4) The
district court found no abuse of the magistrate court’s sentencing discretion. (R., pp. 261-63.)
Bergesen filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. (R., pp. 267-69.)
B.

Standard Of Review
For an appeal from the district court, sitting in its appellate capacity over a case from the

magistrate division, this Court reviews the magistrate court record to determine whether there is
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate court’s findings of fact and whether
the magistrate court’s conclusions of law follow from those findings. State v. Korn, 148 Idaho
413, 415, 224 P.3d 480, 482 (2009). However, as a matter of appellate procedure, the disposition
of the appeal will affirm or reverse the decision of the district court. State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho
965, 968, 318 P.3d 955, 958 (Ct. App. 2014). Thus, this Court reviews the magistrate court’s
findings and conclusions, whether the district court affirmed or reversed the magistrate court and
the basis therefor, and either affirm or reverse the district court. Id.
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Oliver,
144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d
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He also argued that the magistrate court committed an evidentiary error (R., pp. 209-11); failed
to properly advise him regarding the risks of self-representation (R., pp. 211-12); and erred by
declining to consider a Rule 35 motion filed while his appeal to the district court was pending (R.,
p. 214). With respect to the last, based on stipulation of the parties, the district court remanded to
the magistrate court for consideration of the Rule 35 motion prior to resolution of the intermediate
appeal. (R., p. 238.) Thus, that issue has been resolved. The district court rejected Bergesen’s
arguments on the evidentiary issue (R., pp. 254-59) and regarding whether he was adequately
informed of the risks of self-representation (R., pp. 259-61). On appeal to this Court, Bergesen
does not argue that the district court erred on intermediate appeal with respect to any issue other
than the allegedly excessive sentence. (See generally Appellant’s brief.) He has therefore waived
those issues. State v. Boehm, 158 Idaho 294, 301, 346 P.3d 311, 318 (Ct. App. 2015) (issues not
addressed with argument and authority are waived).
3

472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)). In evaluating whether
a lower court abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which asks
“whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” State v.
Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018) (citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163
Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).
C.

Bergesen Has Not Shown The District Court Erred On Intermediate Appeal By
Determining That The Magistrate Court Did Not Abuse Its Sentencing Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish

that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. State v. Farwell, 144
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). To establish that the sentence was excessive, the
appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate
to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.
Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. A sentence is reasonable “‘if it appears necessary to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals
of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.’” Bailey, 161 Idaho at 895-96, 392 P.3d at 1236-37
(quoting State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015)). “In deference to the trial
judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds
might differ. Furthermore, a sentence fixed within the limits prescribed by the statute will
ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial court.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8,
368 P.3d at 628 (internal citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted).
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Bergesen’s sentence of 365 days in jail with 185 days suspended is within statutory limits.5
I.C. § 18-7907(8) (providing that violation of a protection order is a misdemeanor punishable by
at most a year in jail and a fine of $5,000). According to Bergesen, the magistrate nevertheless
abused its discretion―and the district court erred by failing to recognize as much―because the
magistrate court expressed “concern that Mr. Bergesen knew that he was violating the protection
order when his friend sent the text message, that Mr. Bergesen had minimized his conduct, and
that it did not believe Mr. Bergesen would comply with the no contact order it would place upon
him.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) According to Bergesen, that he knew he was violating the
protection order is an element of the offense, not an additional fact warranting a more severe
sentence; his minimization of his conduct was only an accurate statement that his “conduct was in
fact minimal”; there was no evidence to support the magistrate court’s concerns regarding future
violations of the protection order; and, “retribution for presumed future criminal conduct (as
opposed to protection of society) is inconsistent with the applicable sentencing criteria.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-5.)
Bergesen’s argument fails; he misrepresents certain aspects of the magistrate court’s
analysis and ignores others.
As an initial matter, Bergesen entirely ignores the fact that he was convicted of felony
grand theft and was on parole for that crime when he committed the instant offense. (Tr., p. 290,
Ls. 5-9; p. 294, Ls. 8-9.) While not an extensive criminal history, the fact that he had only recently
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Notably, the magistrate court retains the jurisdiction and power to suspend any or all of the
remaining portion of Bergesen’s jail term at any time during that term. I.C. § 19-2601(2). Thus,
even the now-unsuspended jail term can be revisited by the magistrate court while Bergesen is
serving some portion of that term. See
also -State
- --- - - v.
- -Hughes,
- - - - - 102 Idaho 703, 704, 639 P.2d 1, 2
(1981) (in rejecting argument that magistrate court abused its sentencing discretion, noting that the
magistrate court “has continuing jurisdiction until the sentence has been fully executed” and so the
appellant may well serve even less of the then-unsuspended portion of the jail term).
5

been convicted of a felony, was still being supervised on parole for that crime, but still could not
abide by the protection order is suggestive of the need for increased deterrence. See State v. Stone,
147 Idaho 330, 334, 208 P.3d 734, 738 (Ct. App. 2009) (noting “criminal history” as factor in
affirming sentence).
With respect to the claim that the magistrate court improperly considered his willful
violation of the protection order, Bergesen cites no authority for the proposition that it “is an
element of the offense for which he was found guilty” that he “knew that he was violating the
protection order.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) Idaho Code § 18-7907(8) makes “violations of the
provisions of a [properly served] order” a misdemeanor. Likewise, the relevant jury instruction
in this case (to which Bergesen did not object) asked the jury to determine whether Bergesen
violated a provision of the order “by contacting [Ms.] Montgomery through a third party” after he
“had notice of the order.” (Supp. R., p. 31.) Neither the statute nor the jury instruction suggest
that the state was required to show that Bergesen knew that he was violating the order.
While it is certainly an element of the offense that Bergesen had notice of the order, the
magistrate court did not rely on Bergesen having notice of the order as a consideration at
sentencing. Rather, the magistrate court determined that Bergesen―an attorney, though now
disbarred―“knew exactly what [he was] doing” and made a concerted, “clever” effort to violate
the protection order by resuming contact with Ms. Montgomery, but in a manner “that would not
look like it was coming from [Bergesen].” (Tr., p. 298, Ls. 15-19; p. 301, Ls. 4-7.) When Bergesen
was initially confronted with the violation by a police officer, he tried to invoke exactly that
pretense to convince the officer not to refer the violation to a prosecutor, claiming that he did not
contact Ms. Montgomery, but asked a friend to make the contact, that he allegedly did not know
that was a violation, and that the contact was allegedly only to return a Bible. (State’s Ex. 3.) But
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at trial, Bergesen’s defense changed significantly when he called his friend, Mr. Severa, to testify
that Bergesen did not ask him to contact Ms. Montgomery. (Tr., p. 259, Ls. 17-22 (Bergesen
claiming, in closing, that Mr. Severa truthfully testified that Bergesen never asked Mr. Severa to
contact Ms. Montgomery).) For very good reason, the magistrate court (and, the jury) did not
credit Mr. Severa’s testimony that he contacted Ms. Montgomery without having been prompted
by Bergesen to do so, or Bergesen’s pre-trial story that he had Mr. Severa contact Ms. Montgomery
but he did not realize it was improper and did so for the innocent (even virtuous) purpose of
returning her Bible. See Miller v. Callear, 140 Idaho 213, 216, 91 P.3d 1117, 1120 (2004) (“It is
the province of the trial court to weigh conflicting evidence and to judge the credibility of
witnesses.”). That Bergesen knew exactly what the protection order required of him, consciously
disregarded it in an attempt to resume contact with Ms. Montgomery, did so in a manner intended
to disguise his violation, and then attempted to avoid the consequences of his actions by presenting
perjured testimony at trial is certainly indicative of a need for greater punishment and specific
deterrence. See State v. Wheeler, 129 Idaho 735, 740, 932 P.2d 363, 368 (Ct. App. 1997)
(upholding sentence where sentencing court relied, inter alia, on the lack of credibility with respect
to defendant’s explanations of illegal conduct and her manipulation of the system); State v. Li, 131
Idaho 126, 129, 952 P.2d 1262, 1265 (Ct. App. 1998) (noting “planning” of offense and
“credibility gap” as aggravating).
Next, the magistrate court was perfectly clear that the violation of the protection order here
did not involve anything like a threat of violence and did not fault Bergesen for arguing as much.
(Tr., p. 297, Ls. 2-7; p. 298, Ls. 1-2; p. 301, Ls. 2-4.) But the court also recognized that the events
giving rise to the protection order were significantly traumatic on Ms. Montgomery, Bergesen’s
attempt to reinitiate contact (even without any threat of violence) in contravention of the protection
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order was a continuation of that harm, and Bergesen concertedly refused to acknowledge even
that. (Tr., p. 277, L. 24 – p. 279, L. 14 (Ms. Montgomery recounting events leading to protection
order); p. 298, Ls. 2-14.) Nor was this the only occasion on which Bergesen apparently attempted
to use a third party to circumvent the protection order and make contact with Ms. Montgomery.
(Tr., p. 279, L. 15 – p. 280, L. 3 (Ms. Montgomery relating prior occasion on which Bergesen
contacted her through a third-party, this time through a pizza delivery driver with whom Bergesen
worked).) See State v. Wheeler, 129 Idaho 735, 739, 932 P.2d 363, 367 (Ct. App. 1997) (“In
sentencing a defendant, the court may consider hearsay evidence, evidence of previously dismissed
charges against the defendant, or evidence of charges which have not yet been proved, so long as
the defendant has the opportunity to object to, or rebut, evidence of his alleged misconduct.”).
Bergesen declined to take any responsibility or express any regret. As noted above, at trial
he claimed that he had done nothing at all. (Tr., p. 259, Ls. 17-22 (claiming, in closing, that Mr.
Severa truthfully testified that Bergesen never asked Mr. Severa to contact Ms. Montgomery).)
Again, and for good reason, the district court did not credit that claim. Likewise, at sentencing,
Bergesen expressed no regret or sympathy for Ms. Montgomery, and did not take responsibility.
(Tr., p. 289, L. 21 – p. 296, L. 11.) Instead, he repeatedly cast himself as a victim, and Ms.
Montgomery and the prosecutor as villains. (See, e.g., Tr., p. 293, L. 10-12 (claiming he has
“suffered greatly” as a result of his criminal conduct); p. 295, Ls. 13-17 (“I am trying to pick up
the pieces of my life the best I can after suffering humiliation and shame that no one could ever
even contemplate”).) As the magistrate court noted, Bergesen did not make any “statement of
some remorse or regret or empathy or some expression of some form of humanity for what the
survivor of the offense has gone through.” (Tr., p. 299, Ls. 4-11.) See State v. Howry, 127 Idaho
94, 96, 896 P.2d 1002, 1004 (Ct. App. 1995) (“The sentencing court may, of necessity, consider a
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broad range of information, including the evidence of the crime, the defendant's criminal history
and the demeanor of the defendant, including the presence or absence of remorse.”); Li, 131 Idaho
at 129, 952 P.2d at 1265 (noting lack of remorse as factor supporting sentence).
Finally, the magistrate court expressed concern regarding the risk of Bergesen reoffending
by again disregarding the protection order and attempting to resume contact with Ms.
Montgomery. (Tr., p. 300, Ls. 8-16.) Bergesen makes two complaints. First, he suggests that the
magistrate court thereby improperly imposed “retribution for presumed future criminal conduct.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-5.) The magistrate court was not imposing “retribution” for future
criminal conduct, but was expressing a view about the punishment needed for deterrence and the
protection of society. That is, the court was expressing a concern about the risk of re-offense and
a judgment regarding the punishment needed to deter that risk. There is nothing improper in that.
See State v. Wickel, 126 Idaho 578, 581, 887 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Ct. App. 1994) (noting that district
court properly considered risk of re-offense and specific deterrence in devising sentence). Second,
Bergesen claims that there is no evidence to support the magistrate court’s concerns about the risk
of re-offense. (Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) But the evidence is what the court had just set out:
Bergesen’s prior felony and status as a parolee when this crime was committed; Ms. Montgomery’s
report of a violation of the protection order prior to this one; Bergesen’s complete failure to take
responsibility, express remorse, or express sympathy for the victim; his changing stories and lack
of credibility with respect to the events at issue; his cavalier and dismissive attitude towards the
allegations; and the willful and calculated nature of the violation of the protection order. All of
that is evidence to support the magistrate court’s concern that Bergesen would again violate a
protection order absent some significant deterrence, particularly where it is the magistrate court
that was in the best position to evaluate Bergesen’s character and demeanor. State v. Wheeler,
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129 Idaho 735, 739, 932 P.2d 363, 367 (Ct. App. 1997) (“The ability of the trial judge to discern
the character and observe the demeanor of a defendant is essential to the ultimate goal of tailoring
a sentence to the particular defendant.”).
The magistrate court considered and applied the appropriate law, recognized the mitigating
and aggravating factors, balanced and formulated its sentence in light of the goals of sentencing,
and reached the sentence by an exercise of reason. The district court correctly concluded as much.
Bergesen has not shown otherwise.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order on intermediate
appeal affirming Bergesen’s sentence.
DATED this 7th day of September, 2021.

/s/ Andrew V. Wake
ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 7th day of September, 2021, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
JASON C. PINTLER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us
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/s/ Andrew V. Wake
ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General
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